ak.schema.circle_operations.v1
ak.schema.circle_operations.v1 · file: schemas/circle-operations.schema.json Closed request/response DTOs for the self-surface Circle administration operations (ak.self.circle.*). Every write operation carries the caller-signed ak.circle.* Event and the service submits those exact bytes through authority Event submission; the durable Circle object model is circle.schema.json. See spec/v1/zh/models/circle.md and spec/v1/zh/sync/service-http-binding.md.
* $ · anyOf[8]
Closed request/response DTOs for the self-surface Circle administration operations (ak.self.circle.*). Every write operation carries the caller-signed ak.circle.* Event and the service submits those exact bytes through authority Event submission; the durable Circle object model is circle.schema.json. See spec/v1/zh/models/circle.md and spec/v1/zh/sync/service-http-binding.md.
anyOf · anyOf[0] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_create_request_body
Carries the caller-signed ak.circle.create Event and nothing else. The Circle id is retype(create_event.event.event_id), so the service cannot name the Circle and MUST NOT synthesize the Event: every actor-supplied field lives in create_event.event.payload.object, and the parent Realm is create_event.event.realm_id. See spec/v1/zh/models/circle.md and spec/v1/zh/sync/service-http-binding.md.
* create_event · allOf[2]
Closed ak.circle.create Event authored and signed by the authenticated caller. Admission requires the payload closed union and forbids id/mls_group_id. The reducer derives both identifiers. The Circle scope stays plaintext until its own ak.mls.genesis is accepted.
allOf · allOf[0] · object · $ref ./service-operation-dtos.schema.json#/$defs/EventAdmissionSubmission
One exact producer-signed Event submitted to the current governance Station, plus the approval signatures required by a grant, Realm governance or List WIP policy for the Event action or for this registered submit operation. There are no RealmCommit, typed current result, offline-lease or proof-bundle sidecars. approval_signatures is the only sidecar and it is deliberately outside event: the Event bytes and event_id are finished before any approval is signed, so attaching them never changes the Event (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2.5).
* event · object · $ref ./event-envelope.schema.json
Closed producer-signed Event. Shared persistent Events become final only when the current Realm governance Station issues a RealmCommit in the derived Realm, Circle, or Sidecar stream.
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$ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shapeallOf · allOf[6] ·
$ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shapeallOf · allOf[7] ·
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?* event_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/event_idComplete Arkret Event cryptographic identity. The suffix is the canonical unpadded Base64URL encoding of exactly 33 octets: fixed current-v1 suite code 0x01 followed by all 32 octets of the SHA-256 Event digest. Regex validation is only lexical; receivers MUST decode, require 33 octets, require byte 0 == 0x01, canonical re-encode, and verify the full digest before use. Other registered digest suites remain available only to the typed domains that explicitly select them and MUST NOT appear in Event IDs.
pattern:
^ak:event:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* kind ·
stringStandard ak.* Event kinds MUST appear in artifacts/registry/event-kind-registry.json. State convergence is defined by the registered pure reducer over kind + payload; producers do not submit typed current result writes.
pattern:
^ak\.[a-z0-9_]+(\.[a-z0-9_]+)*$realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* scope_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/scope_ref · $ref #/$defs/scope_refRequired producer-signed security scope. The closed union is ordinary existing realm, circle, or native sidecar scope plus the create-only realm_genesis exception. It enters proof.event_digest and E2EE AAD. Reducers independently derive the exact scope from schema-validated payload and accepted references; missing dependencies, nonexistent scope, realm_id mismatch, omitted sidecar_id, substituting circle for sidecar, or any unequal field is fail closed. Sidecar domain Event kinds remain Extension-owned; recognizing this native security shape does not make Kernel interpret the Sidecar reducer. Exact product targets remain inside recipient-visible ciphertext.
* actor_id · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idexecuted_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idauthorization_ref · oneOf[6]
Optional. Required when executed_by is present. It identifies an accepted Grant, delegation Event, DID-document delegation, or one of the closed profile-specific authority constants. The current governance Station evaluates the reference against the target stream's committed state.
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
$ref #/$defs/grant_ref · $ref #/$defs/grant_refoneOf · oneOf[1] ·
$ref #/$defs/event_ref · $ref #/$defs/event_refoneOf · oneOf[2] ·
$ref #/$defs/did_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/did_delegation_refoneOf · oneOf[3] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[4] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[5] ·
$ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_refapplet_id ·
$ref #/$defs/applet_id · $ref #/$defs/applet_idOptional signed Applet provenance. Required by ak.profile.applet_* when the Event is introduced by an Applet, Ghost Actor, bridge, or delegated applet path. Enters canonical event bytes and therefore is covered by proof.event_digest. When present, authorization_ref MUST also be present and resolve to a real active registration/capability grant binding this applet_id, registration_epoch, action and resource per zh/extensions/applet-integration.md sections 4, 8 and 11. Service-actor self-signature proves provenance but is not an authorization substitute. Capability-gated actions require a grant covering action/resource. For subject_only operations the referenced grant binds only the exact active install and cannot replace the subject signature, FSM or independent action authority. Service self-authored Events use ActorId.service; the install grant subject MUST be the same exact ActorId.service as its producer; hosting Station and effective scope are verified separately without coercing a Service into an account variant.
external_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/external_ref · $ref #/$defs/external_refOptional signed external provenance reference for Applet / bridge-originated Events. It is covered by event_digest and MUST NOT be carried only in unsigned when used for loop prevention, audit, or external-message idempotency. Must not contain unauthorized external plaintext.
* created_at ·
$ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestamp · $ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestampsemantic_refs · array<$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref>
Optional semantic refs with role. Omit when there are no semantic references; an explicitly empty array is not canonical. Admission selectors determine any required references. PCR policy recovery has no DID-root anchor reference; its policy/session/replacement-key authority is verified separately.
items ·
$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref · $ref #/$defs/semantic_ref* payload ·
object* producer_proof ·
$ref #/$defs/event_proof · $ref #/$defs/event_proofThe Event's sole portable producer proof. Storage receipts are separate objects and never authorize this Event. producer_proof and unsigned remain outside the canonical Event digest. Exact retries preserve the verified producer proof.
approval_signatures · array<$ref ./approval-signature.schema.json>
One ak.schema.approval_signature.v1 object per approver. An event-target signature binds approval_target.event_id equal to event.event_id. An operation-target signature is allowed only when capability-action-registry.json resolves its action to this exact carrier operation and binds request_canonical_digest to the original typed request with approval_signatures omitted. Every ingress that wraps EventAdmissionSubmission -- ordinary self submit, batch submission, control transactions, facade hand-off -- reuses this one field and MUST NOT define its own DTO. The array is omitted when no approval layer demands evidence; it MUST NOT be present and empty. The governance Station persists the evidence, the verification basis, the nonce consumption and the binding to this submission inside the same atomic acceptance transaction, and the shared Realm Event store keeps the original Event bytes unchanged.
items · object · $ref ./approval-signature.schema.json
The single approval evidence type of v1 (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2). One approver signs one exact target: either a fully authored Event that has not been submitted yet, or the original typed RequestBody of one operation whose evidence carrier is registered in capability-action-registry.json. The object is not an Event, never enters Realm history, and MUST NOT be written into an EventEnvelope, a signed payload or an Event semantic_refs[] entry. It travels in the carrier registered for the approved action. It proves that an approver approved that target; it proves nothing about the initiator's own authority.
* input ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input* proof ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proof · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proofallOf · allOf[1] · object
* event · object
* kind ·
const "ak.circle.create"enum:
"ak.circle.create"anyOf · anyOf[1] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_view
Circle projection returned by create/get/lifecycle operations. MLS activation is derived from an accepted ak.mls.genesis in this Circle stream.
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$profile_ref ·
stringCreate-locked Circle semantic profile discriminator. Ordinary Circles omit it; profile-specific Circles expose it so clients can apply mandatory filtering.
pattern:
^ak\.profile\.[a-z0-9_.-]+\.v1$* title ·
stringsummary ·
string (arkret-short-text) · format=arkret-short-text · $ref string-profiles.schema.json#/$defs/short_textNFC multilingual short text. LF is allowed; CR, other C0/C1 controls, BOM, and bidi embedding/override controls are rejected.
pattern:
^[^\u0000-\u0009\u000B-\u001F\u007F-\u009F\u202A-\u202E\uFEFF]*$* display · object · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display
* short_name ·
stringHuman-facing short name. Unique per (realm_id, short_name) case-insensitive — reducer-enforced. Circle naming has no Sidecar-reserved prefix because Sidecar is a separate native scope.
pattern:
^[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9 _-]{0,23}$* color_token ·
string (enum)Color token from the spec-controlled palette. Clients MUST map token -> theme color (light/dark/high-contrast) consistently across devices; clients MUST NOT reassign tokens.
enum:
"slate" "red" "orange" "amber" "yellow" "lime" "green" "emerald" "teal" "cyan" "sky" "blue" "indigo" "violet" "fuchsia" "pink" "gray_high_contrast"* symbol · object
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
?oneOf · oneOf[1] ·
?emoji ·
stringglyph ·
string (enum)enum:
"lock" "shield" "eye" "eye_off" "user_shield" "fingerprint" "key" "diamond" "flame" "leaf" "authority commit" "compass" "atom" "bolt" "moon" "sun" "star" "globe" "satellite" "ring" "chain" "tag" "flag" "scroll" "scale" "hourglass" "spark"* directory_visibility ·
string (enum)enum:
"members" "realm_members"* join_rule ·
string (enum)enum:
"invite" "knock" "public"* history_access ·
string (enum)enum:
"since_join" "all_history_for_current_members"mls_group_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/mls_group_idRFC 9420 group_id as base64url_no_pad(SHA-256(UTF8("ak.mls.group_id.v1") || 0x00 || canonical_effective_scope_key_bytes(effective_scope))), so exactly 43 characters. Derived by the reducer and the SDK from the effective scope alone; actors never submit it. The v1 formula is the only one: the earlier reversible base64url of the scope key bytes MUST NOT be accepted alongside it. See zh/models/realm-and-space.md section 2.2.
pattern:
^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$* state ·
string (enum) · $ref #/$defs/circle_stateenum:
"active" "archived" "tombstoned"viewer_membership ·
string (enum) · $ref ./event-payload.schema.json#/$defs/membership_stateCanonical materialized membership state enum shared by ak.member.state (Realm) and ak.circle.member.state (Circle). Invite is a separate pending workflow and is never a member state. `knock` denotes a pending self-authored join request; see governance/join-policy.md §5 and models/circle.md §9.1.
enum:
"join" "knock" "leave" "ban"* member_ids · array<$ref #/$defs/actor_id>
Active Circle member ActorIds (strict subset of parent Realm.members). Empty after tombstone. The member count is derived as member_ids.length and is never carried as a separate wire field; directory-only previews never carry member_ids and use the privacy-bucketed preview contract instead.
items · oneOf[2] · $ref #/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_id* created_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_id* created_at ·
string (date-time) · format=date-time · $ref #/$defs/timestampCanonical Arkret-owned absolute instant. UTC Z form with exactly three millisecond digits. Whole seconds MUST use .000Z; offsets, missing/finer fractions, lowercase separators, leap seconds, and invalid Gregorian calendar dates are forbidden. Shape validation by this pattern is supplemented by semantic date validation.
pattern:
^[0-9]{4}-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])T([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]\.[0-9]{3}Z$updated_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idupdated_at ·
string (date-time) · format=date-time · $ref #/$defs/timestampCanonical Arkret-owned absolute instant. UTC Z form with exactly three millisecond digits. Whole seconds MUST use .000Z; offsets, missing/finer fractions, lowercase separators, leap seconds, and invalid Gregorian calendar dates are forbidden. Shape validation by this pattern is supplemented by semantic date validation.
pattern:
^[0-9]{4}-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])T([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]\.[0-9]{3}Z$anyOf · anyOf[2] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_preview
Fixed directory-only response to a joined parent-Realm member who is not a Circle member. It never carries a private Circle field or Event reference.
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* visibility ·
const "realm_members"enum:
"realm_members"* display · object
* color_token ·
string (enum) · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display/properties/color_tokenColor token from the spec-controlled palette. Clients MUST map token -> theme color (light/dark/high-contrast) consistently across devices; clients MUST NOT reassign tokens.
enum:
"slate" "red" "orange" "amber" "yellow" "lime" "green" "emerald" "teal" "cyan" "sky" "blue" "indigo" "violet" "fuchsia" "pink" "gray_high_contrast"* symbol · object · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display/properties/symbol
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
?oneOf · oneOf[1] ·
?emoji ·
stringglyph ·
string (enum)enum:
"lock" "shield" "eye" "eye_off" "user_shield" "fingerprint" "key" "diamond" "flame" "leaf" "authority commit" "compass" "atom" "bolt" "moon" "sun" "star" "globe" "satellite" "ring" "chain" "tag" "flag" "scroll" "scale" "hourglass" "spark"* member_count_bucket ·
string (enum)enum:
"0" "1" "2-3" "4-7" "8-15" "16-31" "32-63" "64-127" "128+"* join_rule ·
string (enum)enum:
"invite" "knock" "public"* opaque_commitment ·
stringpattern:
^[0-9a-f]{64}$anyOf · anyOf[3] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_list
* realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* circles · array<$ref #/$defs/circle_read_view>
items · oneOf[2] · $ref #/$defs/circle_read_view
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_view
Circle projection returned by create/get/lifecycle operations. MLS activation is derived from an accepted ak.mls.genesis in this Circle stream.
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$profile_ref ·
stringCreate-locked Circle semantic profile discriminator. Ordinary Circles omit it; profile-specific Circles expose it so clients can apply mandatory filtering.
pattern:
^ak\.profile\.[a-z0-9_.-]+\.v1$* title ·
stringsummary ·
string (arkret-short-text) · format=arkret-short-text · $ref string-profiles.schema.json#/$defs/short_textNFC multilingual short text. LF is allowed; CR, other C0/C1 controls, BOM, and bidi embedding/override controls are rejected.
pattern:
^[^\u0000-\u0009\u000B-\u001F\u007F-\u009F\u202A-\u202E\uFEFF]*$* display · object · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display
* short_name ·
stringHuman-facing short name. Unique per (realm_id, short_name) case-insensitive — reducer-enforced. Circle naming has no Sidecar-reserved prefix because Sidecar is a separate native scope.
pattern:
^[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9 _-]{0,23}$* color_token ·
string (enum)Color token from the spec-controlled palette. Clients MUST map token -> theme color (light/dark/high-contrast) consistently across devices; clients MUST NOT reassign tokens.
enum:
"slate" "red" "orange" "amber" "yellow" "lime" "green" "emerald" "teal" "cyan" "sky" "blue" "indigo" "violet" "fuchsia" "pink" "gray_high_contrast"* symbol · object
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
?oneOf · oneOf[1] ·
?emoji ·
stringglyph ·
string (enum)enum:
"lock" "shield" "eye" "eye_off" "user_shield" "fingerprint" "key" "diamond" "flame" "leaf" "authority commit" "compass" "atom" "bolt" "moon" "sun" "star" "globe" "satellite" "ring" "chain" "tag" "flag" "scroll" "scale" "hourglass" "spark"* directory_visibility ·
string (enum)enum:
"members" "realm_members"* join_rule ·
string (enum)enum:
"invite" "knock" "public"* history_access ·
string (enum)enum:
"since_join" "all_history_for_current_members"mls_group_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/mls_group_idRFC 9420 group_id as base64url_no_pad(SHA-256(UTF8("ak.mls.group_id.v1") || 0x00 || canonical_effective_scope_key_bytes(effective_scope))), so exactly 43 characters. Derived by the reducer and the SDK from the effective scope alone; actors never submit it. The v1 formula is the only one: the earlier reversible base64url of the scope key bytes MUST NOT be accepted alongside it. See zh/models/realm-and-space.md section 2.2.
pattern:
^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$* state ·
string (enum) · $ref #/$defs/circle_stateenum:
"active" "archived" "tombstoned"viewer_membership ·
string (enum) · $ref ./event-payload.schema.json#/$defs/membership_stateCanonical materialized membership state enum shared by ak.member.state (Realm) and ak.circle.member.state (Circle). Invite is a separate pending workflow and is never a member state. `knock` denotes a pending self-authored join request; see governance/join-policy.md §5 and models/circle.md §9.1.
enum:
"join" "knock" "leave" "ban"* member_ids · array<$ref #/$defs/actor_id>
Active Circle member ActorIds (strict subset of parent Realm.members). Empty after tombstone. The member count is derived as member_ids.length and is never carried as a separate wire field; directory-only previews never carry member_ids and use the privacy-bucketed preview contract instead.
items · oneOf[2] · $ref #/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_id* created_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_id* created_at ·
string (date-time) · format=date-time · $ref #/$defs/timestampCanonical Arkret-owned absolute instant. UTC Z form with exactly three millisecond digits. Whole seconds MUST use .000Z; offsets, missing/finer fractions, lowercase separators, leap seconds, and invalid Gregorian calendar dates are forbidden. Shape validation by this pattern is supplemented by semantic date validation.
pattern:
^[0-9]{4}-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])T([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]\.[0-9]{3}Z$updated_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idupdated_at ·
string (date-time) · format=date-time · $ref #/$defs/timestampCanonical Arkret-owned absolute instant. UTC Z form with exactly three millisecond digits. Whole seconds MUST use .000Z; offsets, missing/finer fractions, lowercase separators, leap seconds, and invalid Gregorian calendar dates are forbidden. Shape validation by this pattern is supplemented by semantic date validation.
pattern:
^[0-9]{4}-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])T([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9]\.[0-9]{3}Z$oneOf · oneOf[1] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_preview
Fixed directory-only response to a joined parent-Realm member who is not a Circle member. It never carries a private Circle field or Event reference.
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* visibility ·
const "realm_members"enum:
"realm_members"* display · object
* color_token ·
string (enum) · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display/properties/color_tokenColor token from the spec-controlled palette. Clients MUST map token -> theme color (light/dark/high-contrast) consistently across devices; clients MUST NOT reassign tokens.
enum:
"slate" "red" "orange" "amber" "yellow" "lime" "green" "emerald" "teal" "cyan" "sky" "blue" "indigo" "violet" "fuchsia" "pink" "gray_high_contrast"* symbol · object · $ref ./circle.schema.json#/$defs/display/properties/symbol
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
?oneOf · oneOf[1] ·
?emoji ·
stringglyph ·
string (enum)enum:
"lock" "shield" "eye" "eye_off" "user_shield" "fingerprint" "key" "diamond" "flame" "leaf" "authority commit" "compass" "atom" "bolt" "moon" "sun" "star" "globe" "satellite" "ring" "chain" "tag" "flag" "scroll" "scale" "hourglass" "spark"* member_count_bucket ·
string (enum)enum:
"0" "1" "2-3" "4-7" "8-15" "16-31" "32-63" "64-127" "128+"* join_rule ·
string (enum)enum:
"invite" "knock" "public"* opaque_commitment ·
stringpattern:
^[0-9a-f]{64}$anyOf · anyOf[4] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_member_request_body
Carries the caller-signed ak.circle.member.state Event and nothing else. The target actor and the membership value live in member_event.event.payload; the Circle is payload.circle_id and MUST equal the path circle_id. The service MUST NOT add a capability verdict to the payload it submits: circle_member_state_payload is closed, and the ak.circle.member.manage decision is the admission path's, evaluated against projected grants rather than asserted by the request.
* member_event · allOf[2]
Closed ak.circle.member.state Event authored and signed by the authenticated caller. The service MUST submit these exact bytes through authority Event submission and MUST NOT co-sign, rebuild or synthesize the Event. Admission MUST verify that event.actor_id is the authenticated caller and that payload.circle_id names the path Circle. Moving another actor to join requires ak.circle.member.manage narrowed by allowed_circle_ids. Every join payload carries parent_membership_revision, the exact typed revision of the target's current parent-Realm member_state join, and admission rejects it unless that current is join at exactly that revision (zh/models/circle.md §9.1); knock requires join_rule=knock. A self-service join is gated on the Circle join_rule instead.
allOf · allOf[0] · object · $ref ./service-operation-dtos.schema.json#/$defs/EventAdmissionSubmission
One exact producer-signed Event submitted to the current governance Station, plus the approval signatures required by a grant, Realm governance or List WIP policy for the Event action or for this registered submit operation. There are no RealmCommit, typed current result, offline-lease or proof-bundle sidecars. approval_signatures is the only sidecar and it is deliberately outside event: the Event bytes and event_id are finished before any approval is signed, so attaching them never changes the Event (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2.5).
* event · object · $ref ./event-envelope.schema.json
Closed producer-signed Event. Shared persistent Events become final only when the current Realm governance Station issues a RealmCommit in the derived Realm, Circle, or Sidecar stream.
allOf · allOf[0] ·
?allOf · allOf[1] ·
?allOf · allOf[2] ·
?allOf · allOf[3] ·
?allOf · allOf[4] ·
?allOf · allOf[5] ·
$ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shapeallOf · allOf[6] ·
$ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shapeallOf · allOf[7] ·
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?* event_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/event_idComplete Arkret Event cryptographic identity. The suffix is the canonical unpadded Base64URL encoding of exactly 33 octets: fixed current-v1 suite code 0x01 followed by all 32 octets of the SHA-256 Event digest. Regex validation is only lexical; receivers MUST decode, require 33 octets, require byte 0 == 0x01, canonical re-encode, and verify the full digest before use. Other registered digest suites remain available only to the typed domains that explicitly select them and MUST NOT appear in Event IDs.
pattern:
^ak:event:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* kind ·
stringStandard ak.* Event kinds MUST appear in artifacts/registry/event-kind-registry.json. State convergence is defined by the registered pure reducer over kind + payload; producers do not submit typed current result writes.
pattern:
^ak\.[a-z0-9_]+(\.[a-z0-9_]+)*$realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* scope_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/scope_ref · $ref #/$defs/scope_refRequired producer-signed security scope. The closed union is ordinary existing realm, circle, or native sidecar scope plus the create-only realm_genesis exception. It enters proof.event_digest and E2EE AAD. Reducers independently derive the exact scope from schema-validated payload and accepted references; missing dependencies, nonexistent scope, realm_id mismatch, omitted sidecar_id, substituting circle for sidecar, or any unequal field is fail closed. Sidecar domain Event kinds remain Extension-owned; recognizing this native security shape does not make Kernel interpret the Sidecar reducer. Exact product targets remain inside recipient-visible ciphertext.
* actor_id · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idexecuted_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idauthorization_ref · oneOf[6]
Optional. Required when executed_by is present. It identifies an accepted Grant, delegation Event, DID-document delegation, or one of the closed profile-specific authority constants. The current governance Station evaluates the reference against the target stream's committed state.
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
$ref #/$defs/grant_ref · $ref #/$defs/grant_refoneOf · oneOf[1] ·
$ref #/$defs/event_ref · $ref #/$defs/event_refoneOf · oneOf[2] ·
$ref #/$defs/did_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/did_delegation_refoneOf · oneOf[3] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[4] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[5] ·
$ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_refapplet_id ·
$ref #/$defs/applet_id · $ref #/$defs/applet_idOptional signed Applet provenance. Required by ak.profile.applet_* when the Event is introduced by an Applet, Ghost Actor, bridge, or delegated applet path. Enters canonical event bytes and therefore is covered by proof.event_digest. When present, authorization_ref MUST also be present and resolve to a real active registration/capability grant binding this applet_id, registration_epoch, action and resource per zh/extensions/applet-integration.md sections 4, 8 and 11. Service-actor self-signature proves provenance but is not an authorization substitute. Capability-gated actions require a grant covering action/resource. For subject_only operations the referenced grant binds only the exact active install and cannot replace the subject signature, FSM or independent action authority. Service self-authored Events use ActorId.service; the install grant subject MUST be the same exact ActorId.service as its producer; hosting Station and effective scope are verified separately without coercing a Service into an account variant.
external_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/external_ref · $ref #/$defs/external_refOptional signed external provenance reference for Applet / bridge-originated Events. It is covered by event_digest and MUST NOT be carried only in unsigned when used for loop prevention, audit, or external-message idempotency. Must not contain unauthorized external plaintext.
* created_at ·
$ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestamp · $ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestampsemantic_refs · array<$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref>
Optional semantic refs with role. Omit when there are no semantic references; an explicitly empty array is not canonical. Admission selectors determine any required references. PCR policy recovery has no DID-root anchor reference; its policy/session/replacement-key authority is verified separately.
items ·
$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref · $ref #/$defs/semantic_ref* payload ·
object* producer_proof ·
$ref #/$defs/event_proof · $ref #/$defs/event_proofThe Event's sole portable producer proof. Storage receipts are separate objects and never authorize this Event. producer_proof and unsigned remain outside the canonical Event digest. Exact retries preserve the verified producer proof.
approval_signatures · array<$ref ./approval-signature.schema.json>
One ak.schema.approval_signature.v1 object per approver. An event-target signature binds approval_target.event_id equal to event.event_id. An operation-target signature is allowed only when capability-action-registry.json resolves its action to this exact carrier operation and binds request_canonical_digest to the original typed request with approval_signatures omitted. Every ingress that wraps EventAdmissionSubmission -- ordinary self submit, batch submission, control transactions, facade hand-off -- reuses this one field and MUST NOT define its own DTO. The array is omitted when no approval layer demands evidence; it MUST NOT be present and empty. The governance Station persists the evidence, the verification basis, the nonce consumption and the binding to this submission inside the same atomic acceptance transaction, and the shared Realm Event store keeps the original Event bytes unchanged.
items · object · $ref ./approval-signature.schema.json
The single approval evidence type of v1 (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2). One approver signs one exact target: either a fully authored Event that has not been submitted yet, or the original typed RequestBody of one operation whose evidence carrier is registered in capability-action-registry.json. The object is not an Event, never enters Realm history, and MUST NOT be written into an EventEnvelope, a signed payload or an Event semantic_refs[] entry. It travels in the carrier registered for the approved action. It proves that an approver approved that target; it proves nothing about the initiator's own authority.
* input ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input* proof ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proof · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proofallOf · allOf[1] · object
* event · object
* kind ·
const "ak.circle.member.state"enum:
"ak.circle.member.state"anyOf · anyOf[5] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_member_delete_request_body
Carries the caller-signed ak.circle.member.state leave Event and nothing else. The path circle_id and actor_id MUST respectively equal member_event.event.payload.circle_id and payload.member_id; member_event.event.realm_id MUST equal the path Circle's parent Realm. The path name actor_id is a route selector only; the canonical Event payload identity field is member_id. The service submits the exact signed Event through authority Event submission and MUST NOT rebuild it or synthesize a leave Event.
* member_event · allOf[2]
Closed ak.circle.member.state Event authored and signed by the authenticated caller, with membership fixed to leave and expected_membership carrying the concrete current membership as the signed expected_revision guard. Admission MUST bind the Event proof to the exact account-local lineage selected by the authenticated session; matching only the caller DID is insufficient. Removing another actor requires ak.circle.member.manage narrowed to the path Circle; self-service leave uses ak.circle.member.add.
allOf · allOf[0] · object · $ref ./service-operation-dtos.schema.json#/$defs/EventAdmissionSubmission
One exact producer-signed Event submitted to the current governance Station, plus the approval signatures required by a grant, Realm governance or List WIP policy for the Event action or for this registered submit operation. There are no RealmCommit, typed current result, offline-lease or proof-bundle sidecars. approval_signatures is the only sidecar and it is deliberately outside event: the Event bytes and event_id are finished before any approval is signed, so attaching them never changes the Event (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2.5).
* event · object · $ref ./event-envelope.schema.json
Closed producer-signed Event. Shared persistent Events become final only when the current Realm governance Station issues a RealmCommit in the derived Realm, Circle, or Sidecar stream.
allOf · allOf[0] ·
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$ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_admission_shapeallOf · allOf[6] ·
$ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shape · $ref #/$defs/registered_execution_shapeallOf · allOf[7] ·
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?* event_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/event_idComplete Arkret Event cryptographic identity. The suffix is the canonical unpadded Base64URL encoding of exactly 33 octets: fixed current-v1 suite code 0x01 followed by all 32 octets of the SHA-256 Event digest. Regex validation is only lexical; receivers MUST decode, require 33 octets, require byte 0 == 0x01, canonical re-encode, and verify the full digest before use. Other registered digest suites remain available only to the typed domains that explicitly select them and MUST NOT appear in Event IDs.
pattern:
^ak:event:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* kind ·
stringStandard ak.* Event kinds MUST appear in artifacts/registry/event-kind-registry.json. State convergence is defined by the registered pure reducer over kind + payload; producers do not submit typed current result writes.
pattern:
^ak\.[a-z0-9_]+(\.[a-z0-9_]+)*$realm_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/realm_idRetyped ak.realm.create Event token. It therefore carries the same fixed current-v1 0x01/SHA-256 content-address identity and is not selected by Realm state.
pattern:
^ak:realm:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* scope_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/scope_ref · $ref #/$defs/scope_refRequired producer-signed security scope. The closed union is ordinary existing realm, circle, or native sidecar scope plus the create-only realm_genesis exception. It enters proof.event_digest and E2EE AAD. Reducers independently derive the exact scope from schema-validated payload and accepted references; missing dependencies, nonexistent scope, realm_id mismatch, omitted sidecar_id, substituting circle for sidecar, or any unequal field is fail closed. Sidecar domain Event kinds remain Extension-owned; recognizing this native security shape does not make Kernel interpret the Sidecar reducer. Exact product targets remain inside recipient-visible ciphertext.
* actor_id · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idexecuted_by · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_idauthorization_ref · oneOf[6]
Optional. Required when executed_by is present. It identifies an accepted Grant, delegation Event, DID-document delegation, or one of the closed profile-specific authority constants. The current governance Station evaluates the reference against the target stream's committed state.
oneOf · oneOf[0] ·
$ref #/$defs/grant_ref · $ref #/$defs/grant_refoneOf · oneOf[1] ·
$ref #/$defs/event_ref · $ref #/$defs/event_refoneOf · oneOf[2] ·
$ref #/$defs/did_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/did_delegation_refoneOf · oneOf[3] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_participant_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[4] ·
$ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_ref · $ref #/$defs/direct_conversation_bootstrap_authority_refoneOf · oneOf[5] ·
$ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_ref · $ref #/$defs/membership_compensation_delegation_refapplet_id ·
$ref #/$defs/applet_id · $ref #/$defs/applet_idOptional signed Applet provenance. Required by ak.profile.applet_* when the Event is introduced by an Applet, Ghost Actor, bridge, or delegated applet path. Enters canonical event bytes and therefore is covered by proof.event_digest. When present, authorization_ref MUST also be present and resolve to a real active registration/capability grant binding this applet_id, registration_epoch, action and resource per zh/extensions/applet-integration.md sections 4, 8 and 11. Service-actor self-signature proves provenance but is not an authorization substitute. Capability-gated actions require a grant covering action/resource. For subject_only operations the referenced grant binds only the exact active install and cannot replace the subject signature, FSM or independent action authority. Service self-authored Events use ActorId.service; the install grant subject MUST be the same exact ActorId.service as its producer; hosting Station and effective scope are verified separately without coercing a Service into an account variant.
external_ref ·
$ref #/$defs/external_ref · $ref #/$defs/external_refOptional signed external provenance reference for Applet / bridge-originated Events. It is covered by event_digest and MUST NOT be carried only in unsigned when used for loop prevention, audit, or external-message idempotency. Must not contain unauthorized external plaintext.
* created_at ·
$ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestamp · $ref #/$defs/canonical_event_timestampsemantic_refs · array<$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref>
Optional semantic refs with role. Omit when there are no semantic references; an explicitly empty array is not canonical. Admission selectors determine any required references. PCR policy recovery has no DID-root anchor reference; its policy/session/replacement-key authority is verified separately.
items ·
$ref #/$defs/semantic_ref · $ref #/$defs/semantic_ref* payload ·
object* producer_proof ·
$ref #/$defs/event_proof · $ref #/$defs/event_proofThe Event's sole portable producer proof. Storage receipts are separate objects and never authorize this Event. producer_proof and unsigned remain outside the canonical Event digest. Exact retries preserve the verified producer proof.
approval_signatures · array<$ref ./approval-signature.schema.json>
One ak.schema.approval_signature.v1 object per approver. An event-target signature binds approval_target.event_id equal to event.event_id. An operation-target signature is allowed only when capability-action-registry.json resolves its action to this exact carrier operation and binds request_canonical_digest to the original typed request with approval_signatures omitted. Every ingress that wraps EventAdmissionSubmission -- ordinary self submit, batch submission, control transactions, facade hand-off -- reuses this one field and MUST NOT define its own DTO. The array is omitted when no approval layer demands evidence; it MUST NOT be present and empty. The governance Station persists the evidence, the verification basis, the nonce consumption and the binding to this submission inside the same atomic acceptance transaction, and the shared Realm Event store keeps the original Event bytes unchanged.
items · object · $ref ./approval-signature.schema.json
The single approval evidence type of v1 (zh/authz/constraint-schema.md section 9.2). One approver signs one exact target: either a fully authored Event that has not been submitted yet, or the original typed RequestBody of one operation whose evidence carrier is registered in capability-action-registry.json. The object is not an Event, never enters Realm history, and MUST NOT be written into an EventEnvelope, a signed payload or an Event semantic_refs[] entry. It travels in the carrier registered for the approved action. It proves that an approver approved that target; it proves nothing about the initiator's own authority.
* input ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_input* proof ·
$ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proof · $ref #/$defs/approval_signature_proofallOf · allOf[1] · object
* event · object
* kind ·
const "ak.circle.member.state"enum:
"ak.circle.member.state"* payload · object
* membership ·
const "leave"enum:
"leave"* expected_membership ·
string (enum) · $ref ./event-payload.schema.json#/$defs/membership_stateCanonical materialized membership state enum shared by ak.member.state (Realm) and ak.circle.member.state (Circle). Invite is a separate pending workflow and is never a member state. `knock` denotes a pending self-authored join request; see governance/join-policy.md §5 and models/circle.md §9.1.
enum:
"join" "knock" "leave" "ban"anyOf · anyOf[6] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_membership_outcome
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$* member_id · oneOf[2] · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/actor_id
Complete protocol identity for an Event author or Realm member: account carries the exact AccountId for every Station-hosted principal; service identifies a service acting as itself. The discriminator is validated against accepted registration and admission evidence; it never authorizes itself. Account and service are distinct, and no comparison may fall back to a bare principal_id. Agent and integration classification, provisioning, controller binding and credential authorization are independently verified facts, not identity variants. Account actors at different Stations MUST NOT share or inherit authority merely because their principal_id, DID controller or signing key matches, including membership, capability, RealmCommit-signing and recovery authority.
oneOf · oneOf[0] · object
* kind ·
const "account"enum:
"account"* account_id ·
$ref #/$defs/account_id · $ref #/$defs/account_idoneOf · oneOf[1] · object
* kind ·
const "service"enum:
"service"* service_id ·
$ref #/$defs/did_core_id · $ref #/$defs/did_core_id* membership ·
string (enum) · $ref ./event-payload.schema.json#/$defs/membership_stateCanonical materialized membership state enum shared by ak.member.state (Realm) and ak.circle.member.state (Circle). Invite is a separate pending workflow and is never a member state. `knock` denotes a pending self-authored join request; see governance/join-policy.md §5 and models/circle.md §9.1.
enum:
"join" "knock" "leave" "ban"anyOf · anyOf[7] · object · $ref #/$defs/circle_scope_rotate_outcome
* circle_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/circle_idpattern:
^ak:circle:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{44}$mls_group_id ·
string · $ref ./common-ids.schema.json#/$defs/mls_group_idRFC 9420 group_id as base64url_no_pad(SHA-256(UTF8("ak.mls.group_id.v1") || 0x00 || canonical_effective_scope_key_bytes(effective_scope))), so exactly 43 characters. Derived by the reducer and the SDK from the effective scope alone; actors never submit it. The v1 formula is the only one: the earlier reversible base64url of the scope key bytes MUST NOT be accepted alongside it. See zh/models/realm-and-space.md section 2.2.
pattern:
^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$note ·
stringReducer-emitted reason code on Ignored / Rejected, or unsupported-feature note while MLS scope rotation is not wired end-to-end.
Source
- registry row:
spec/v1/artifacts/registry/schema-registry.json - schema document:
spec/v1/artifacts/schemas/circle-operations.schema.json